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Public Infrastructure, Congestion and Fiscal Policy
1 Introduction
By the late 1980s, the search for explanations for the slowdown in the rate of
productivity growth in the US and other OECD countries had stimulated consid-
erable interest in the macroeconomic role of public infrastructure. In particular,
Aschauer (1989) who modeled the aggregate production function with public
expenditure as an input and undertook an empirical investigation for the US,
concluded that the size of the `core' infrastructure (roads, airports, sewers, etc.)
had a signi¯cant impact on productivity. However, Aschauer's results have been
hotly debated (see Fernald, 1999) and the inclusion in macro models of a produc-
tive role for public expenditure has remained relatively uncommon. Exceptions
include Lindbeck and Nandakumar (1990) and Baxter and King (1993). See also
the early contributions of Grossman and Lucas (1974) and Barro (1981).
When public expenditure is included as an argument of the production func-
tion in the macroeconomics literature it is usually treated as a pure public good.
However, this approach fails to take into account that the core infrastructure is
the classic case in which congestion may occur. Empirical evidence indicates, for
example, that congestion on US roads has held back productivity signi¯cantly
since about 1973 (Fernald). In this paper we therefore develop a simple macroe-
conomic model in which the productive e®ects of public expenditure are allowed
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for, but the possibility of congestion is also recognized: public expenditure pro-
vides an impure public good.
For simplicity, we restrict the analysis in this paper to perfect competition.
Insofar as there is congestion in the use of public infrastructure, ¯rms overuse
it; that is, goods output exceeds the welfare-maximizing level. We therefore
determine the tax rate that will correct for this distortion, as well as characterizing
the optimal level of public expenditure.
2 The Model
Consider a closed non-monetary economy for a single time period, with perfectly
competitive goods and labor markets. The goods market is in long-run equilib-
rium, with zero pro¯t. The representative household has a Cobb-Douglas utility
function,
u = C±(1¡ L)1¡±, 0 < ± < 1, (1)
where C is the quantity it purchases of the representative good, L is the time it
spends working, and 1 is its time endowment. Using the good as num¶eraire, the
household's budget constraint is
C = wL¡ T , (2)
2
where w is the real wage rate and T is a lump-sum tax.
Maximizing (1) subject to (2) yields the goods demand and labor supply
functions
C = ±(w ¡ T ) (3)
L = ± +
(1¡ ±)T
w
. (4)
The government buys a quantity of the representative good G, which it trans-
forms freely, at a constant proportionate rate, into infrastructure. We therefore
refer to G interchangeably as `government expenditure' and `infrastructure.' We
shall consider the possibility that the government discourages overuse of infras-
tructure by Pigouvian taxation. The analysis is developed in terms of a per unit
tax rate t on labor input, but a tax on output would have equivalent e®ects.
Assuming that the government's budget is balanced,
G = T + twL (5)
There are N ¯rms producing the representative good, where N is large. The
representative ¯rm uses input l of labor services to produce output y, according
to
y =
µ
G
Y µ
¶²
l, 0 < ² < 1, 0 · µ · 1, (6)
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where Y is the aggregate output of the good and ² and µ are parameters. Y = Ny,
but since the ¯rm is `small' it treats Y as a parameter. From the perspective of
the ¯rm (i.e., given G and Y ), equation (6) exhibits constant returns. (G=Y µ)² is
a shift parameter and is our representation of the °ow of services from the stock
of infrastructure G. A greater value of (G=Y µ)² entails more services for the
¯rm and therefore a higher labor productivity. For example, if the government
improves the transport infrastructure, the ¯rm may transport its output using
less labor time. ² is the elasticity of the °ow of services from the infrastructure
with respect to the amount of the infrastructure G. We assume that 0 < ² < 1
to represent the idea that, in terms of the ¯rm's labor productivity, there are
diminishing marginal returns to improvements in the infrastructure.
The parameter µ is our measure of the extent to which the infrastructure is
prone to congestion. If µ = 0, (G=Y µ)² reduces to G² and so the ¯rm's labor
productivity is independent of aggregate production. Alternatively, suppose µ =
1, so that (6) becomes y = g²l, where g ´ G=Y , the infrastructure per unit of
output in the economy. If, say, aggregate output Y doubles, with G held constant,
the ¯rm's labor productivity falls. The amount of infrastructure would have to be
doubled in order to restore the ¯rm's level of labor productivity. We regard µ = 1
as representing a high level of congestion in the use of infrastructural services.
Similarly, if 0 < µ < 1, the economy is regarded as being subject to milder
congestion. We exclude the case of µ > 1 because it has no obvious intuitive
justi¯cation.
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Aggregating (6) over the N ¯rms, and taking into account that the labor
market clears, the aggregate production function is
Y =
µ
G
Y µ
¶²
L, (7)
where L = Nl. (7) can be rewritten,
Y = G
²
1+²µL
1
1+²µ :
Thus, paralleling endogenous growth models, if µ < 1 aggregate production dis-
plays increasing returns to scale with respect to fG;Lg. However, there are
decreasing returns for the ¯rm with respect to l, which, together with the fact
that the ¯rms do not co-ordinate their activity, enables a competitive equilibrium
to obtain (Klibano® and Morduch, 1995).
Each ¯rm is a price-taker and an infrastructure service-taker. In long-run
equilibrium the cost per worker equals the average product:
w(1 + t) =
µ
G
Y µ
¶²
. (8)
The system of equations (3), (5), (8) and (7), plus the goods market equilibrium
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condition Y = C +G, reduces to
Y = (1¡ ±)G+ ±
1 + t
µ
G
Y µ
¶²
(9)
The right-hand side is decreasing in Y and so the solution is unique; dY=d² > 0
and dY=dµ < 0.
3 Optimal Fiscal Policy
If µ > 0 a decision by a ¯rm to expand its output imposes a negative externality
on all other ¯rms. Since, in the absence of government intervention, there is
no mechanism to internalize this external e®ect, the individual ¯rm's output
level is too high. As a consequence, the equilibrium achieved by the economy is
ine±cient, so corrective action may be taken in the form of a Pigouvian tax.
Proposition 1 For any given level of G, the optimum tax rate t is t^ = µ²
Proof. Di®erentiate (1)-(5) and (8)-(7) totally. Holding G constant, we
obtain du=dt = [(t ¡ µ²)±u=C(1 + t)](dY=dt). From (9), dY=dt 6= 0. Therefore
t^ = µ² is the f.o.c. At t = t^, d2u=dt2 = [±u=C(1 + t)](dY=dt) < 0.
With labor the only factor that can be varied at the discretion of the individual
¯rm, a tax on labor input and a tax on output can have the same e®ects. Thus,
equivalent to the tax rate t^ on labor, a per unit tax rate ¿^ on output may be
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imposed, where
¿^ =
µ²
1 + µ²
. (10)
The optimal tax rate t^ (or ¿^ ) is increasing in µ, the congestion parameter, and
in ², the elasticity of the °ow of infrastructural services with respect to the amount
of infrastructure G. If there is no congestion (µ = 0) there should be no tax. In
the presence of congestion, however, the greater is the potential e®ectiveness of
the services (as measured by ²), the more the use of the infrastructure should be
taxed. When ² is large, congestion has a greater opportunity cost and so should
be taxed at a higher rate. Note that in order to set t = t^, the government does
not need to know the propensity to consume ± (this property holds for a more
general utility function). Also, t^ is independent of G and g (though this is the
result of our assumption that ² and µ are constants).
Proposition 2 If t = t^, the optimum value of g is
g^(t^) =
²
1 + µ²
(11)
Proof. Similar to Proposition 1. For given t, du=dG = [±u=C(1 + t)]f[²Y ¡
(1 + t)G]=G+ (t¡ µ²)dY=dGg. For t = t^; (11) is therefore the f.o.c. The s.o.c. is
dY=dG < (1+ µ²)=² (the e®ect on output of a marginal increase in infrastructure
is not `too' strong), which we assume is satis¯ed.
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> From (11), g^(t^) is increasing in ² and decreasing in µ. If t is set optimally,
the optimum ratio of G to Y is increasing in the potential e®ectiveness of infras-
tructural services, but decreasing in the size of the congestion parameter. Like t^,
g^(t^) is independent of ±.
Proposition 2 speci¯es the optimum value of g when t is set optimally. More
generally, for any given value of t, the optimum value of g is
g^(t) =
[1 + (1 + ¹)t]²
[1 + (1 + ¹)µ²](1 + t)
(12)
where ¹ = (w=L)(@L=@w) for constant u; i.e., ¹ = (1¡L)±=L. It is evident that
if t 6= t^ the value of g^(t) is dependent on consumer preferences. Furthermore,
gives dg^(t)=dt > 0: the more that the externalities are discouraged, the greater
is the proportion of Y that the government should devote to infrastructure.
To identify explicitly the general equilibrium e®ects of an increase in infras-
tructural spending, we di®erentiate (5), (7) and (9) totally, and use (3) to obtain,
for any ft; gg,
dY
dG
=
±²+ (1¡ ±)(1 + t)Y µ²
±µ²g + (1 + t)Y µ²
(13)
In the equivalent model with no infrastructure, ² = 0 and dY=dG = 1¡ ±. With
infrastructure, however, since ² > 0, we ¯nd from (13) that, given that g < 1,
dY=dG > 1 ¡ ±. In fact, because labor productivity is increasing in G; it is
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possible that dY=dG > 1. For example,
dY
dG
jg=g^(t)= (1 + ¹)(1 + t)
1 + (1 + ¹)t
> 1. (14)
An implication is that at g^(t) a small increase in G, through its e®ect on labor
productivity, would raise consumption C. However, this would, as a second-order
e®ect, reduce welfare: the induced rise in labor supply would have a disutility
that outweighed the utility of increased consumption.
4 Concluding Comments
Our model brings together the macroeconomic modelling of the e®ects of gov-
ernment expenditure with the approach taken to modelling congestion in the
welfare economics literature (e.g., Cornes and Sandler, 1996). Unlike the latter,
we separate consumers and ¯rms as decision-makers and emphasize macroeco-
nomic factors such as national income and the multiplier. Further development
of the model would allow for the labor input that is necessary to transform tax
revenue into infrastructure, and for consumption of infrastructural services by
households. There is also scope to develop a dynamic formulation along the lines
of endogenous growth theory.
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